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WEST VIRGINIA

LAW QUARTERLY
and THE BAR
VOLUME

XXIV

FEBRUARY, 1928

NUMBER 2

THE CHANGING LAW OF COMPETITION IN
PUBLIC SERVICE-ANOTHER WORD
THOMAS PORTER HARDMAN*

In the last volume of the Law Quarterly' the writer discussed some pregnant possibilities of the recent Reynolds
Taxi Company Case;2 and already the third-born3 is being
heralded in headlines and editorials as a "startling" prodigy. 4 Accordingly it is the purpose of this paper to say
just a word about the newly arrived by way of an appendix
to the writer's more extended discussion of these possibilities.
The last arrived first saw the light of day -or-as some
seem to think-the darkness of night, on September the
twentieth nineteen hundred and twenty-seven, under the
following circumstances: Carriers by automobile applied
to the State Road Commission for "initial" certificates of
convenience to operate bus service over public highways
paralleling the lines of established carriers by street car
and railroad. Soon afterwards the established carriers,

* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
T. P. Hardman, "The Changing Law of Competition in Public Service," 33 W.
VA. L. QuAi. 219 (April, 1927).
2 Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, 136 S. E. 833 (W. Va. 1927).
SMonongahela West Penn Public Service Co. et a. v. State Road Commission et al.,
139 S. E. 744 (W. Va. 1927). The firstborn, Quesenberry et al. v. State Road Commis.
sion et al., 138 S. E. 362 (W. Va. 1927), and United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 138 S. E. 388 (W. Va. 1927) which however is not a full-blood relative,
are hereinafter discussed.
' See, e. g., The New Dominion (Morgantown, W. Va.), Sept. 21 and 30, and
Dec. 6 (1927).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1928

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [1928], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

through their subsidiaries, 5 also applied for certificates of
convenience to operate bus service over such highways.
The carriers by automobile were not "established" carriers, but the commission awarded certificates to these carriers apparently "because of priority of application," and
refused certificates to the established carriers' subsidiaries,
hereinafter called the established carriers.0
The circuit
court granted writs of certiorariand cancelled the certificates
awarded by the commission. Where there was nearby adequate street car service paralleling the highway the circuit
court did not award any certificate of convenience to operate bus service. But where there was no such parallel street
car service, the circuit court awarded certificates of convenience to the established carrier to operate bus service.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the
circuit court. 7 But Judge Woods filed a vigorous and im-

portant dissenting opinion. Let us, therefore, examine the
dissenting opinion as well as the majority opinion in order
to determine what conclusion is socially desirable.
Much could be said against the validity of the action of a
court in directly awarding certificates of convenience rather than referring the case back to the commission for correct administrative determination in accordance with doctrines laid down by the court or legislature. Is not such &ction typically administrative?8 Does not such court action
violate fundamental principles of administrative law?9
This is the effect of the transactions as interpreted by the majority of the
Supreme Court of Appeals.' But Judge Woods in his dissenting opinion thinks that In
this respect the established carriers' subsidiaries cannot be treated as If they vere the
established carriers. The majority view, for reasons hereinafter explained, seems correct
o03 this point.
6 See note 5,.supra.
Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co. et aX. v. State Road Commission at al.,
mupra, n. 8.
What is administrative action as distinguished from judicial action?
A leading
tExt-writer says: "[As differentiated from judicial action, administrative action] may be
distinguished by the fact that the action **** is not necessarily, or even often, the result
o; any controversy and is not merely dependent on the solution of the question What Is
the law? but is made also as a result of considerations of expediency. Thus, in the
first kind of work [judicial work or action], all the officer has to do [according to the
tleory of our law] is to determine what is the law applicable to the facts brought bcfore him; in the second kind of work [administrative] he must determine, of coqrse,
what is the law in order to determine whether h! is competenh to act; but furthermore
he must decide whether, in case he is competent, it is wise for him to act. In the first
case, for example, the officer is to determine whether under the law a given piece of
property belongs to A or B; in the second case he is to determine, for example, whether,
conceding he has the power, it is wise for him to grant to A a license *o0o*. In these
Isat cases, it is true, the law may provide that before he grants A his license he must
hear the objections which A's neighbors may have to the granting of the ienso **0.
In both of these cases, something in the nature of a controversy may thus arise. But
it is not a controversy as to the applicability of the law but rather ond as to the expsdiency of the action which it is proposed to take.
"Now the Anglo-American law denominates the first kind of action as Judicial, and

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol34/iss2/2

2

Hardman: The Changing Law of Competition in Public Service--Another Word
THE CHANGING LAW OF COMPETITION

The only justification made by the majority for this procedure is that the West Virginia Code 10 requires the circuit
court on certiorarito "determine all questions arising on the
law and evidence, and render such judgment or make such
order upon the whole matter, as law and justice may require";
and that this statute "indubitably" authorizes such procedure.
But this quotation from the statute omits the first part of
the sentence which is that upon certiorarithe "circuit court
shall in addition to determining such questions as might have
been determined upon a certiorari,as the law heretofore was,
review such judgment, order or proceedings of the **** inferior tribunal upon the merits, determine etc."'11 And as
the West Virginia Court had previously pointed out, per
Brannon, J., the purpose of this statute was "to let the court
'review' the case on the law and evidence, as it was before the
lower tribunal, in order to determine whether that tribunal
had done injustice * * * *. It says the circuit court shall 're2
view' the judgment, not re-try the case."'
In the principal case the dissenting judge seems to take
the position that the action of the commission in determining
whether it should grant certificates to this applicant or to
that is not subject to judicial review at aZl because "not judicial." But while it is true that such action is not wholly judicial, the better view is that such administrative action is
quasi-judicial in that the Commission, much after the manner
of a court, has a hearing in which the pecuniary or property
interests of contestants are determined by a final order.13
And on certiorariquasi-judicial determinations of administrative tribunals are "reviewable" by the courts to some extent,
e. g., to the extent of ascertaining whether the administrative
has correctly applied any applicable legal principle1 4 such as
the second kind of action as administrative." GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMuINmITRATiVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 9-10 (1905).
This differentiation need not be adopted verbatim, literatim, et punctatim, but it will

suffice to show that the granting of such licenses as certificates of convenience to operate motor busses is typically administrative rather than judicial action.
'Cf. CONSTITUTION or W. VA., Art. V §1. and Alderson v. Commissioners, 82 W.

Va. 454 (1889)

where the W. Va. court points out that the power conferred on the

circuit court by the statute in question is to "'review' the case on the law and evidence,
as it was before the lower tribunal, in order to determine whether that tribunal had
done injustice
. It [the W. Va. statute] says the circuit court shall °revieve the
judgment not re-try the case."
30 C. 110, §3.
11

Id.

12 Alderson v. Commissioners, 82 W. Va. 454, 462 (1889).
23 See BAILEY, HABEAS CORPUS AND SPECIAL REMEDIES,
MECHEM, PUBLIC OMCEs, §1011 (1890).
See infra, n. 15.
14 See MECHEM, op. cit., supra n. 13, §1011.

Italics ours.
et seq. (1913).

§17l1
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the legal principle laid down by our court that the policy of
this state does not favor ruinous competition in public service. On certiorari,therefore, the courts can correct any
quasi-judicial administrative determination that violates such
legal principles, 15 and under our statute on certiorari can,
within the limits of appropriatecourt action, render such decision as the inferior tribunal should have rendered. But
within the limits of typically administrative action expressly entrusted by legislation to a commission, can the
courts (as they did here) not simply "review" the case but
substitute their administrative opinions for those of the
administrative tribunal set up by law for the determination
of the question, and administratively award such certificate
of convenience as the courts think the administrative should
have awarded? 16 That, however, is not primarily a question as to the changing law of competition and, therefore,
a full or further discussion thereof is beyond the purview of
17
this article.
A point strongly emphasized by the dissenting judge is
that in determining whether a certificate of convenience
and necessity should be granted to operate a motor vehicle
service the granting tribunal "cannot consider other transportation facilities, such as railroads, in passing on the
question of convenience and necessity, but must limit
inquiry to the motor vehicle business." There is some authority supporting this position. 18 It is submitted, however,
that such an unqualified proposition is untenable, 19 in as
much as a contrary conclusion is more desirable and is con20
sistent with our statute.
To illustrate, suppose that the established utility is an
ordinary street car line operated by the A Company. The
1 Ibid. Mechem says: "When the writ of certiorari is issued to an offier having
only quasi-judicial powers ***** errors and irregularities may be corrected, and the court
will examine the evidence, to determine whether there was any competent evidenc to
justify the adjudication made, and whether, in making It, any rule of law affecting the
rights of the parties has been violated."
1s Cf. Alderson v. Commissioners, 32 W. Va. 454 (1889) and Dryden v. Swinburn,
15 W. Va. 234 (1879).
"7See T. P. Hardman, "The Extent of the Finality of Commissions Rate Regulations," 28 W. VA. L. QUAR. 111 (1922), and T. P. Hardman, "Judicial Review as a Requirement of Due Process in Rate Regulation." 10 YAx a L. J. 681 (1921), where the
writer has discussed at considerable length the extent to which courts should "review"
administrative determinations.
19 See, Rapid Railway Co. v. Michigan Publio Utilities Commission, 225 Mich. 425,
19.6 N. W. 518 (1923), but Mr. Justice Fellows vigorously dissented.
" See the forceful argument of Fellows, J., in Rapid Railway Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, supra, n. 18.
20 See Acts of W. Va. 1925, c. 17, §82, class H.
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B Company applies for a certificate of convenience to operate a motor bus service along the very same street, making stops at the same times and placeg at which the street
cars stop. If the service of the street car company is adequate and at reasonable rates, it certainly cannot be said
with justification that public convenience and necessity
sanction granting a certificate of convenience and necessity
to operate such parallel synchronous motor bus service
merely because the other service is a street car service
rather than a motor car service. The two services are so
substantially similar that either service is a permissible
substitute service for the other. What the public along the
route is entitled to is proper transportationservice. The law
cannot justifiably satisfy the wishes of a part of the public
who may prefer to travel by bus rather than by street car
if street car service is a reasonable substitute for bus service
and if to satisfy such wishes, by permitting such competition, will, in the long run, probably prevent the general public
along the route from getting proper transportation service
by street car or by bus or by both. As the public along the
route is, by hypothesis, already receiving adequate transportation service at reasonable rates, a duplication of transportation service of the same or such substitute class will
in the long run likely prevent the public from being served
as efficiently, economically and with as good equipment as
the public could be served by a properly regulated single
service.
Therefore, in .the principal case, if there was already
adequate street car service along one of the proposed bus
routes, there is no justification for granting a certificate of
convenience and necessity to any one to render duplicate
transportation service along such route. If the rates by
street car are too high, the remedy is a proceeding to lower
them to reasonable rates. But if because of infrequency of
stops or otherwise the street car or other service is not a
reasonable or fair substitute for bus service, so that it cannot
be said that the public along the proposed bus route is receiving adequate transportation service of the class proposed to be furnished by the bus line, or a reasonable substitute for such class, then, of course, if there is demand for
such service, such public is entitled to receive adequate
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service of such class or substitute class. Therefore, the only
question is, who is entitled to priority in furnishing such additional service? And in determining this question we
must consider not only whether the proposed new public
service will in the long run be better rendered by the competitor, but also whether in the long run the other service,
such as street car service or ordinary railroad service, will be
properly rendered by permitting such competition. For along
such route the public as a whole, not simply a part of that
public, is entitled tq the best practicable public service both
by bus and by rail. And for reasons elaborated in the writer's first article on this question, it is submitted that under
proper regulation of the single service, the public service as
a whole, that is both by bus and by rail, will in the long run
be rendered more efficiently, economically and by the better equipment by preventing such unreasonably wasteful
competition where, as in the principal case, it appears that
the established carrier by rail can, under proper governmental regulation, be relied upon to render the proposed
service properly.
The test, therefore, is whether the granting of initial
certificates of convenience to the established utility or to
a would-be competitor or to both will better promote the
public interest in having adequate and economical public
service. It may seem that such a test generally ignores the
interest of the competitor. But that interest is a private or
individual interest, and the interest in having public service
as a whole (not for the moment but for all time) rendered
most economically and otherwise satisfactorily is a public
or social interest. 21 This private interest of the competitor
to be allowed to render this service conflicts with the public
interest in having this service together with the other service rendered, in the long run, more economically and satisfactorily than in all probability such public service both by
bus and by rail would, in the long run, be rendered under
ruinous competition. Therefore, since the law cannot secure both this private interest and this public interest, the
This use of the terms "public interests" or "social interests" is explained In the
writer's original article. Though the words "public interest" more accurately refer to
the claims or wants of the state either as a juristic person or as guardian of social
interests, the words, out of deference to common usage, are here used as including the
wants or interests of the community or society generally, ,i.e., social interests.
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law secures the more important interest, viz., the public interest. This is simply an application of a universally applicable proposition that the end of the law is to secure, as far
as it is practicable to do so, the various human wants or
interests (individual, public, social), involved in a case, and
where these interests conflict so that it is necessary to sacrifice some of these interests to some extent at22 least, then
to secure the most important of these interests.
Thus, individual interests are to be secured only to the
extent that the securing of such interests at the same time
adequately secures the public interest involved; for it is
almost universally conceded today that public or social
interests are in general more important than private
or individual interests. As the United States Supreme
Court has recently put it: "There must be progress, and
if in its march private interests are in the way they must
yield to the good [i. e., the interests] of the community."
So in the principal case, if the interests of the community
as a whole will in the long run be better secured by sacrificing the private interest of the would-be competitor in
public service, such private interest "must," as the United
States Supreme Court put it, "yield to the good of the community."
Another point, perhaps the major point, made by the dissenting judge is that the majority of the court bases its
opinion primarily upon the proposition that when one of
several applicants for an "initial" permit to operate motor
busses is an established carrieroperating a parallel transportation service, such established carrier has "a property right"
involved, and that "the policy of the state ***** is to protect such public servants in the enjoyment of their rights."
The dissenting opinion denies that the established carrier
has "a property right" involved.
Just what the learned judge means here by a property
right is not altogether clear. If, as some seem to think, it
is meant that the established carrier has a property right
in or over the public highway upon which it is proposed to
operate busses, of course, there is no such "property right"
or property interest. But certainly the established carrier
22 See POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHy OF LAW, 59-99

(1922).

Is Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 410 (1915).
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has a property (right or) interest in maintaining its established service without financial impairment caused by a competitive service. Therefore, the question is, inter alia, whether this property interest is entitled to protection against
ruinous competition by a bus service which is about to be
established over a public highway.
If this property interest is considered solely as the private
or individual interest of the.carrier, i.e., if we do not consider the public interests involved, the answer is emphatically
no; for so considered the private or individual interest of the
would-be competitor to operate is equally entitled to protection. But, as the writer pointed out at length in his previous
article, it is not primarily the right or interest of the established carrier that the changing law is seeking to protect by
preventing ruinous competition: it is primarily the right or
interest of the public in order that, in the language of the
West Virginia Court, 24 "the public may be served most efficiently and economically, and by the best equipment reasonably necessary." This primary purpose will result incidentally in protecting the above-mentioned property interest of
the established carrier in its investment. And certainly
the law should protect such property interest of an established carrier where in protecting such interest such protection, as the writer has shown to be true in this type of
case, also best protects the paramount public interest in
having the most economical and best practical public service, and where such protection does not sacrifice a more
important interest. Apropos of this point the Virginia
court has recently said that upon application by a motor
vehicle carrier for a certificate of convenience and necessity, "existing transportationsystems should be protected so
' '25
far as compatible with the public interest.
A further point made by the dissenting judge seems to
be that there is no legislation in this state sanctioning a policy against competition in public service, and therefore, apparently, that the courts cannot justifiably declare such a
policy. The court, in the syllabus, says that this "policy,
as expressed in legislative enactments," requires etc. The
21 In Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson. 186 S. E. 833 (W. Va. 1927), but quoted from
Princeton Power Co. v. Calloway, 99 W. Va. 157, 128 S. E. 89 (1926).
2 Norfolk Southern Rty. Co. v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 179, 189, 126 S. E. 82 (1925).
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word policy (a word of objectionable obscurity) is here
used, it would seem, in the sense of a legal principle or
legal doctrine. Now, it is quite true that legislative enactments in this state do not fully express any such policy or
principle, and only to a certain extent can it be said that
such a policy or principle can be implied from the "road
law. ' 2 Therefore, it does not seem to be justifiable to say,
with the court, that this "policy" is "expressed in legislative enactments." But neither does it seem to be justifiable to say that it is never the function of the courts to declare a "policy" or legal principle as to matters affecting
the "property" interests of the litigants before the court.
That is a question which in this connection involves primarily the doctrine of stare decisis, which the writer has
discussed at length elsewhere in this quarterly 27 and, therefore, will not repeat here. Suffice it to say that, notwithstanding statements to the contrary, where pressing interests so require the common-law courts have frequently declared such so-called "policies." It is true that such a judicial promulgation of such a principle or "policy" is judicial
legislation. But even the conservative Mr. Justice Holmes
has long since admitted that within certain limits "the
judges do and must legislate. ' 28 In the language of another
of America's greatest judges, 29 "the nature of the judicial
process" is such that within its appropriate limits judicial
legislation is justifiable. This policy, then, is largely a
judge-made policy. And frankness in admitting the fact
that courts do so legislate when justice requires will prevent much legal stagnation and promote a more healthy
growth of the law.30
The final point emphasized by the dissenting judge is
that "even though it be admitted that the **** [established carriers] have a right of priority to pre-empt the
field of motor bus service, that right does not necessarily
extend to their subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are separate and distinct corporate entities." It is submitted that
21 Acts of W. Va., 1925, c. 17.
2 Thomas P. Hardman, "Stare Decisis and The Modern Trend," 32 W. VA. L.
QUAR. 163 (1926).
23 In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221 (1917).
20 CA DoZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Lecture III (1922).
Cf. CARDOZO,
THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 120 (1924). See accord an excellent note
by A. L. C., 27 YALE L. J. 668 (1917).
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this is unduly emphasizing the form rather than the substance. It is true that for justifiable reasons the law ordiiarily treats a corporation as an entity separate and distinct from the persons composing it. But this entity is a
mere (though generally useful) fiction, and When pressing
interests so require the courts will look behind the corporate fiction and see who are the real persons that constitute the corporation. In this way we see that the established carriers are the real persons that will be benefitted
or injured by benefit or injury to their subsidiaries. Therefore, to the extent that the public interest in having proper
public service requires us to protect the established carriers We must protect their subsidiaries, otherwise we are
not only emphasizing form rather than substance, but we
are sacrificing the public interest in having proper public
service in order to secure mere form. It would seem, therefore, that in order adequately to secure the paramount public interest in having the most economical and satisfactory
public service, we, as did the majority of the court, may in
this respect treat the subsidiaries of the established carriers
just as if they were the established carriers themselves.
Having attempted to answer the dissent, let us briefly
apply the above-discussed 31 doctrines to the facts of the
three recent West Virginia cases. As to the principal case,
already considered from the opposite angle, but little more
need be said. Where as in this case an "initial" 32 permit is
sought to operate bus service and one of the several applicants is an established carrier, mere "priority of application," apparently the reason why the commission preferred
the not-yet-established carrier, should not be enough to
justify a public-granted authorization of competition over
the public highway. The public, through its commission
and courts, should be allowed to regulate the use of the
public highways in the manner that will best promote the
public interest. Therefore, if before an "initial" certificate
of convenience is finally awarded, an established utility
Discussed mostly in the original article.

'2 The word "initial" was inserted by the court in a "modification" of Its original
opinion. Apropos of this point, the court says: "The decision ***** applies only to a

choice of applicants for a permit over a bus route about to be established.

It has no

reference to a case where a railroad or street car company Is an applicant for permia.

sion to operate motor vehicles over an established bus route. The holder of the permit
over the established route is entitled to the same protection and consideration as any
other public utility."
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applies for such initial certificate, the award should be
made to the utility which, under the above-discussed principles, would in the long run probably insure the better and
more economical public service in the whole field of service
involved, namely, the bus service and the rail service. It
is the public interest in the maintenance of adequate and
economical public service both by bus and by rail that must
be secured. Therefore, on the substantive law as to competition, the conclusion of the court in the West Penn Case
seems to be quite justifiable.
In the companion case of Quesenberry v. State Road
Commission,3 3 the court held that as neither of the applicants for initial certificates of convenience was what the
court calls an "established" carrier, no "property" right
was involved and, therefore, the action of the commission
in awarding certificates was "administrative" rather than
"judicial" and "does not come within the realm of the judiciary." Hence, the court refused to set aside the action
of the commission in granting certificates of convenience to
two rival applicants to operate busses over the same route.
Here, the court in effect permits competition in public service because it says it is not "within the realm of the judiciary" to correct such non-judicial, administrative action.
It is true that such action of a commission is not wholly
judicial. But it is submitted that it is quasi-judicial. Each
applicant at the time of the application is already actually
operating transportation service over the route in question.
The commission is determining which of two public carriers
is entitled to continue to operate and thus secure property
interests. One of these carriers is contesting the right of the
other to secure this property interest. The commission has
a hearing much after the manner of court hearings and
enters a final judgment or order.3 4 The proceeding, therefore, partakes of the nature of a litigation in court and involves the property interests of contesting parties. Hence,
the administrative determination that one or both of the
contestants shall be entitled to this property advantage is
quasi-judicial. And it is generally held that quasi-judicial
- 188 S. E. 362 (W. Va. 1927).
, See a description of the proceedings before the commission by Lively J. In Quesenberry v. State Road Commission, 138 S. E. 362 (W. Vj. 1927).
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3
administrative determinations are reviewable by certiorari.5
action of the commisIt would seem, therefore, that such
36

sion is reviewable by the courts.

But it does not follow that the actual conclusion reached
by the court is unjustifiable. It seems that each applicant
was properly equipped to render adequate service. The
preponderance of the evidence was that one service was sufficient and that two could not operate at a profit, but there
was trustworthy evidence to the contrary. Moreover, as
already indicated in part, while neither of the applicants
is what the court calls an "established carrier," neither bus
company having operated under a certificate of convenience, the fact is that both applicants had for a considerable
time prior to their applications actually "operated over the
route under their taxi licenses." As a practical matter, therefore, it would seem that both applicants had acquired business interests which would be protected by a certificate or
injured by being refused a certificate. Hence, in a practical sense, both applicants were established common carriers
by bus over this route at the time of the application for the
initial permit. Furthermore, the court says that an "inference may be drawn [from the evidence] that the commission concluded that the public would be best served by two
companies." Hence, if "the public would be best served by
two companies," (and the commission is in a better position than the courts to know if this would be true) permitting competition would better secure the paramount public
interest in having the "best" public service. Therefore, after the commission has granted certificates to two thus
established competitors, can the courts justifiably say, under the circumstances, that there was no competent evidence on which the commission, applying the correct principles as to competition, could reasonably have reached the
conclusion which it did? If not, it would seem that, in
such cases, the courts should not substitute their judgments
for the judgment of the expert administrative tribunal set
up by law to determine the question. Due process should
not require, an efficient administration of justice does not
Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, 136 S. E. 833 (W. Va. 1927) and authorities cited.
See MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICES, §1011 (1890).
See

MECHEM,

PUBLIC

OFFICERS,

§1011

(1890).
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permit, an "independent judicial re-examination" of such
37
an administrative determination.
In the writer's former discussion of the so-called "policy"
against ruinous competition, it was advocated that the policy should not be confined to "public carriers" or to cases
where legislation requires a certificate of convenience.
And since then the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has decided an important case which tends to support
the argument therein advocated. In that case,3 8 two natural gas companies, the A Company and the B Company,
were serving a community in which a large manufacturing
company was located. The rates of the A Company, as
limited by the public service commission, were lower than
the rates of the B Company. The manufacturing company
which, apart from the question of rates, is receiving satisfactory service from the B Company, demands service from
the A Company solely because of the lower rates of the A
Company. The commission ordered the A Company to
supply gas to the manufacturing company. 9 This would
require an expenditure by the A Company of a very large
sum of money. The court reversed the order of the commission, thereby eliminating the forced competition. It was
"undisputed" that thus to deprive the B Company of its
large manufacturing consumer would be to prevent the B
Company from making "any appropriate return on the investment." And the decision of the court in this respect
seems to go, largely at least, on the theory that when a
customer of a gas company is adequately served, apart
from the question of rates, to sanction duplication of service to such customer by another company is to sanction
unreasonable competition in public service, which is detrimental to public interests. The court intimates that the
proper remedy is a proceeding to regulate the rates of the
B Company so that the rates charged by the B Company

n Cf. T. P. Hardman, "Judicial Review as a Requirement of Due Process in Rate
Regulation," 30 YALE L. J. 681 (1921), and T. P. Hardman, "The Extent of the Finality of Commissions' Rate Regulations," 28 W. VA. L. QuAF. 111 (1922).
s' United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 138 S. E. 388 (W. Va. 1927).
31 The commission also permitted the B Company to cease to serve the manufacturing company, if the B Company so desired. But if the B Company ceased to serve
this large consumer it could not make an adequate return on its investment.
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are no more than reasonable. 40 In other words, in this respect the practical effect of the decision is to sanction regulated monopoly rather than competition, here compelled
competition. The case, therefore, illustrates one aspect of
the policy against unreasonable competition in public service, and that too where the utility is not a public carrier
and where there is no statutory requirement for a certificate of convenience.
Though the vigorous dissent of two oT the judges shows
that there is much room for reasonable argument on this
question, it is submitted that the majority reach the right
conclusion. Where, as here, a single public service is satisfactory apart from the question of rates, and in this respect will, in all probability, continue to be satisfactory, it
is economically unsound to compel competitive duplication
of service solely for the purpose of securing cheaper service.
The economically and legally sound remedy is a thorough,
administrative court-reviewable regulation of the single
service by requiring adequate service at reasonable rates, not
art unreasonably wasteful authorization or compulsion of
ruinous competition with its probable ultimate sacrifice of
the paramount public interest in having the whole community
(i. e., the communities of both companies) served "most efficiently and economically, and by the best equipment reasonably necessary."
,0The court says: "Why not reduce its rates if too high, and not burden the other
utility with a service neither desired nor justly imposed upon it?" May we not qay:
"Why not reduce its rates if too high, and not burden the" public with Increased rates
based on increased investment and/or with a probable impairment of public service
caused by unreasonable competition?
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